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Due to its flexible and pervasive sensing ability, crowdsensing has been extensively studied recently in research
communities. However, the fundamental issue of how to meet the requirement of sensing robustness in
crowdsensing remains largely unsolved. Specifically, from the task owner’s perspective, how to minimize the
total payment in crowdsensing while guaranteeing the sensing data quality is a critical issue to be resolved. We
elegantly model the robustness requirement over sensing data quality as chance constraints, and investigate
both hard and soft chance constraints for different crowdsensing applications. For the former, we reformulate
the problem through Boole’s Inequality, and explore the optimal value gap between the original problem
and the reformulated problem. For the latter, we study a serial of a general payment minimization problem,
and propose a binary search algorithm that achieves both feasibility and low payment. The performance gap
between our solution and the optimal solution is also theoretically analyzed. Extensive simulations validate
our theoretical analysis.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the provision of real-time environmental information (e.g., traffic condition,
noise level and air quality, etc) to citizens is increasingly demanded in daily life. Due to
the proliferation of hand-held mobile devices equipped with various sensors, crowdsensing
(Ganti et al. 2011) becomes an effective way to collect sensing information with a low
deployment cost. In crowdsensing, instead of deploying many fixed sensors in the target
area, human crowds with mobile devices (say participants) act as mobile sensors to gather
the information of the surrounding area, and utilize the cellular network to upload data
for crowdsensing applications. Due to its high efficiency and ubiquity (Han et al. 2015),
crowdsensing has spurred a wide interest from both academic and industry for designing
many interesting crowdsensing applications (Khan et al. 2013).
1
To fully exploit the benefits of crowdsensing, we need to address several challenges.
First, a certain level of sensing robustness should be guaranteed. In practice, it is hardly
to accurately estimate how many people will participate in the crowdsensing task, because
their decisions are affected by various factors. Since most of involved participants are
unprofessional, the sensing data from a single participant would be untrusted or with low
quality (Wang et al. 2012, Min et al. 2013). Therefore, a minimum number of participants
is required to guarantee the sensing robustness, which is imposed by many crowdsensing
applications (Duan et al. 2012, He et al. 2014). Moreover, since a crowdsensing task usu-
ally involves the collection of sensing data at different times and different locations, e.g.,
updating the PM2.5 information every hour in the daytime in various areas of a city, the
robustness requirement can be both time-specific and location-specific. Then, how to sat-
isfy the time-specific and location-specific requirement is urgent for sensing robustness in
crowdsensing.
Second, since participating in crowdsensing consumes physical resources and requires
manual efforts, the participants with rationality will expect financial or social rewards
from the owner who disseminates the crowdsensing task. Due to limited budget, from
the perspective of the owner, it should minimize the total payment while satisfying the
minimum participants requirement as much as possible. There is a tradeoff between the
minimization of total payment and satisfaction of minimum participants requirement. A
higher reward (referred as bid in this paper) usually attracts more participants because of a
larger accept-to-participate probability from the potential participants (Zhang et al. 2014).
This can lead to a high total payment, although the minimum participants requirement
can be satisfied easily. On the contrary, if the owner provides a lower bid, people could have
less interest in participating resulting in fewer participants, despite a low total payment.
In this paper, we study the problem of minimizing the total payment over all time
slots and locations while guaranteeing the sensing robustness in crowdsensing. Different
from existing studies, we model the requirement on the sensing robustness as a chance
constraint, which guarantees that the probability of achieving the minimum participants
requirement at any time slot and any location is not lower than a predefined level. In
addition, for many crowdsensing applications, e.g., environment monitoring, imposing such
strong requirement of sensing robustness at each time slot is unnecessary. It is sufficient
to guarantee a high probability that there are enough participants at any location during
the task duration. For example, people sometimes are interested in average air condition
during a day. Above models are flexible and well capture the features of sensing robustness
requirement in crowdsensing.
Bearing in mind different levels of sensing robustness requirement, we propose two types
of chance constraints, i.e., hard chance constraint and soft chance constraint. In the hard
chance constraint case, we require that the joint probability of achieving the minimum
participants requirement at all time slots and locations is no less than 1− ǫ, where ǫ > 0
is close to 0. A typical example is monitoring outages of public works (e.g., broken traffic
lights, malfunctioning fire hydrants) by crowdsensing (Ganti et al. 2011). In the soft chance
constraint case, for any location l, the probability of achieving αl percentage of required
participant number during task duration is no less than β, where β > 0 is close to 1. It
is suitable for the applications with relatively loose robustness requirement, e.g., pollution
monitoring in a city (Dutta et al. 2009).
However, solving problems with chance constraints are usually challenging because
these constraints are generally difficult to be expressed in a closed form except in very
few cases (Nemirovski and Shapiro 2006). Although some chance-constrained optimization
techniques have been applied in existing works (e.g. So and Zhang 2013, Kim et al. 2013,
Wang et al. 2014, Qu et al. 2015), only feasible solutions without performance guarantee
are obtained. In this work, to solve the problem with a hard chance constraint, we refor-
mulate it as a solvable convex problem using Boole’s Inequality (Bonferroni 1936), which
is an approximation problem of the original one. Their theoretical performance gap is also
derived. For the soft chance constraint case, we first transform it into a general payment
minimization problem, and analyze the feasibility of its optimal solution to the original
problem. Thus motivated, we propose a binary search algorithm to find a feasible solution
of the original problem, whose performance gap is theoretically analyzed.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We study the problem of minimizing the total payment with the sensing robustness
requirement in crowdsensing, which is yet seldom studied in many crowdsensing appli-
cations. Instead of using the expectations in existing works, we are the first to model
the payment minimization crowdsensing problem using chance constraints, which better
characterize the demand of crowdsensing and is more flexible in realistic. According to
the different levels of the sensing robustness requirement, we propose both hard chance
constraint and soft chance constraint to model the payment minimization crowdsensing
problem.
• For the hard chance constraint case, via Boole’s Inequality, we reformulate the problem
into a solvable convex problem, which is actually an approximation of the original problem.
By analyzing the difference in the constraints, we theoretically derive the optimal value
gap between the two aforementioned problems, which is largely ignored in previous chance-
constrained optimization approaches. Further, by introducing a relaxation problem of the
original one, we enhance the above optimal value gap.
• For the soft chance constraint case, which cannot be directly reformulated via Boole’s
Inequality, we study a general payment minimization problem with parameters γ. By
studying the properties of the optimal solutions of this problem, we find that the feasibility
of its optimal solution to the original problem strictly increases with the increase of γ. We
then propose a binary search algorithm based on Monte Carlo method, to obtain a feasible
solution of the original problem with a high probability, whose performance compared with
the optimal solution is also theoretically analyzed.
• We also study a special case of the soft chance constraint in which both the sensing
robustness requirement and bidding function are time independent, and derive a closed
form of the solution by approximation. The bidding policy from our solution is state inde-
pendent, which is described by a static bidding price (location-specific) over the time.
Although the general optimal bidding policy in this kind of problem is state dependent,
the distinct advantage of our state independent bidding policy is simple to compute, com-
pared with the complex computational optimal policy. The bound of the performance gap
between our solution and the optimal solution is also derived.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related works is briefly reviewed in
Section 2 and the basic crowdsensing model is introduced in Section 3. We tackle the crowd-
sensing problem with a hard chance constraint and with multiple soft chance constraints
in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. In Section 6, we conduct extensive simulations to
validate our theoretic analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
In essence, our aim is to design incentive policies for crowdsensing, to ensure the sens-
ing robustness while minimizing the total payment. There are extensive studies about
the incentive design for crowdsensing in existing works. Reddy et al. (2010) studies the
participatory sensing performance of incentive policies with different micro-payment incen-
tive structures. This work mainly focuses on recording the participation likelihood, and
pays little attention in incentives. Additionally, there are several empirical experiments
(Mason and Watts 2010, Musthag et al. 2011, Yu et al. 2014) demonstrating the impact
of social and financial incentives on the willingness of participants as well as the uploaded
sensing data quality. However, these experiment works fail to design a flexible incentive
policy to fulfill the diverse sensing robustness requirement.
Additionly, Lee and Hoh (2010) propose a reverse auction based dynamic bidding policy
to encourage participants to upload the sensing data with the claimed bids. Yang et al.
(2012) proposes incentive policies based on both a user-centric and platform-centric model
for crowdsourcing to smartphones, which can adjust the participants’ behavior for better
crowdsensing performance. Kawajiri et al. (2014) develops a wireless indoor localization
system based on crowdsensing, and guides participants to cover enough locations for the
improvement of quality of service. And Koutsopoulos (2013) studies the problem of mini-
mizing platform’s total cost while guaranteeing service quality, and proposes an incentive
policy to determine payment allocation and participation level. Moreover, although both
Han et al. (2015) and Zhang et al. (2014) consider the minimum number of participants in
the execution of a crowdsensing task, they simply employ the expectation in the constraint
or utilize a deterministic constraint that the requirement should be satisfied at any time.
Nonetheless, these studies either have separately addressed the incentive issues and sensing
robustness concerns, or have not well characterized the sensing robustness requirement.
In contrast, in this work, we systemically study the incentive policy design with the sens-
ing robustness guarantee in crowdsening, and model the sensing robustness requirement
as chance constraints, which are more flexible for designing intelligent incentive policies.
Furthermore, we study two kinds of chance constraints based on the different levels of
sensing robustness in various crowdsensing applications, i.e., hard chance constraint and
soft chance constraint. And in both cases, We theoretically analyze the performance gap
between our solution and the optimal solution, while this kind of theoretical results is
seldom presented in previous chance-constrained optimization works (e.g. So and Zhang
2013, Kim et al. 2013, Wang et al. 2014, Qu et al. 2015), which usually obtain feasible
solutions only.
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Figure 1 In crowdsensing, the sensing data needs to be collected both at different times and different places.
3. Model
We consider a task owner whose sensing task lasting for a certain amount of time, which
is divided into a number of discrete slots, over a target area. Typically, such tasks can
be monitoring outages of public works or air pollution for citizens in a city during each
day. This type of task usually involves the collection of sensing data at different times and
different places, as shown in Fig. 1. The sensing robustness requirement of the task may vary
in both spatial and temporal dimensions. According to (Han et al. 2015, Zhang et al. 2014),
this requirement can be ensured by involving at least a minimum number of participants
in the crowdsensing task. To conduct the task, the owner recruits a number of participants
for data collection. In each time slot, the task owner interacts with potential participants
as follows:
1) the owner firstly releases the task with its bidding, i.e., the rewards for conducting
the task, to all potential participants in the target area;
2) given the bidding, the potential participants decide whether to participate or not,
and then send the decision to the owner;
3) upon receiving the response, if the number of potential participants accepting the
participation is no less than a predefined threshold (e.g., rmin), the owner randomly selects
rmin participants from these potential participants
1, and pays the corresponding bid price
after receiving the sensing data uploaded by these participants; otherwise, the owner won’t
do anything until next slot, i.e., he will give up the task during the current time slot.
Let T = {1, ..., T} denote the set of time slots. Assume that the target area can be
divided into several locations, and the set of locations is denoted by L = {1, ..., L}. Let
rlt and x
l
t be the minimum number of required participants and the actual number of
1How to incorporate the selection of participants with high reputation in our problem is left for future study.
participants chosen by the owner at time t ∈ T at location l ∈ L, respectively. According
to the crowdsensing described above, the value of xlt can be as follows:
xlt =


rlt if the number of potential participants accepting the
bid price at time t at location l is no less than rlt,
0 otherwise.
Next, we formally define the strategy profile of the owner and participants respectively
as follows:
Definition 1 (Bidding Vector) The bidding vector of the owner at time t ∈ T is defined
as bt := (b
1
t , ..., b
L
t ), where b
l
t is the bid for location l and bounded by a maximum value b
l
max,
i.e., blt ∈ [0, blmax].
Note that for different time slots and different locations, the bids may be different. For
example, in the traffic volume monitoring application, the amount of the task varies from
rush hours to idle hours, as well as from urban areas to suburbs. Given the differentiated
amount of the task, a smart owner should also change its bidding policy adaptively. The
current bidding vector in Fig. 1 is (2, 3, 1, 3, 4, 2, 1, 3, 2).
Given a bid, a potential participant randomly decides whether to accept or reject, whose
distribution is determined by:
Definition 2 (Accept-to-Participate Function) The accept-to-participate function of a par-
ticipant at time t∈ T at location l ∈L is defined by:
ρlt(b) : [0, b
l
max]→ [0,1].
Generally, the greater value of b, the larger probability of accepting to participate.
However, the increasing trend of the accept-to-participate probability will decrease as the
growth of b, a.k.a., the marginal effect. In other words, for any t∈ T , l ∈L, ρlt(b) is strictly
increasing and concave in b∈ [0, blmax] (Zhang et al. 2014).
To facilitate the mathematical formulation of our problem, we define the bidding function
blt(ρ) as the inverse function of ρ
l
t(b) as follows.
Definition 3 (Bidding Function) The bidding function of the owner at time t ∈ T at
location l ∈L is defined by:
blt(ρ) : [0,1]→ [0, blmax].
By definition, blt(ρ) is the required bid at time t at location l to ensure an accept-to-
participate probability of ρ. Since ρlt(b) is strictly increasing and concave in b ∈ [0, blmax],
blt(ρ) is strictly increasing and convex in ρ∈ [0,1].
Let Alt be the event of x
l
t = r
l
t (∀t ∈ T , l ∈ L). If we define ρlt as the success probability
that Alt happens, i.e., ρ
l
t =Pr{xlt = rlt}, then the expected payment at time t at location l
will be
E[xltb
l
t] = ρ
l
tr
l
t× blt(ρlt), (1)
where ρltr
l
t is the expected number of participants chosen by the owner in the participation
at time t at location l, and blt(ρ
l
t) is the bid for participants at time t at location l ensuring
an accept-to-participate probability ρlt among the potential participants. Therefore, the
total expected payment of the owner over all time slots and locations is
E
[
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
xltb
l
t
]
=
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
E[xltb
l
t] =
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t). (2)
We study this problem from the owner’s perspective with the objective of minimizing
the total payment over all time slots and locations, while satisfying the sensing robustness
requirement as much as possible. Depending on the satisfactory level of the sensing robust-
ness requirement in different crowdsensing applications, we model two types of chance
constraints in the optimization problem. i.e., hard chance constraint and soft chance con-
straint. In the first type of constraint, the joint probability that the sensing robustness
requirement at all time slots and locations can be satisfied is no less than 1 − ǫ, while
in the second one, for any location l ∈ L, the probability that at least αl percent of the
requirement can be satisfied during the task duration is no less than β. We deal with the
crowdsensing problems with the two types of chance constraint in Section 4 and Section
5, respectively.
4. Crowdsensing with Hard Chance Constraint
In this section, we study the crowdsensing problem with a hard chance constraint on the
sensing robustness requirement. Due to the hardness using the chance constraint, this
problem will be reformulated using Boole’s Inequality, in order to obtain a feasible approx-
imation solution of the original problem. We then derive the performance gap between the
optimal solution and the approximation one.
4.1. Problem Statement
In essence, the owner’s objective is to minimize the total payment, while maintaining
the probability of satisfying the sensing robustness requirement at any time slot and any
location no less than a predefined value 1− ǫ, where ǫ is a small value close to 0, e.g., 0.02.
Based on Eq. (2) and the definition of ρlt, we mathematically formulate the crowdsensing
problem with a hard chance constraint in the following:
PA1: Crowdsensing with a Hard Chance Constraint2
min
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t)
subject to
T∏
t=1
L∏
l=1
ρlt ≥ 1− ǫ, (3)
ρlt ∈ [0,1],∀t∈ T , l ∈L.
The above problem is hard to solve, due to the combinatorial difficulty in the mul-
tiplication form in constraint (3), where the variable ρlt is continuous. In the following,
we reformulate the problem into a solvable convex problem, by using Boole’s Inequality.
Through this reformulation, the new constraint will share a similar additive structure with
the objective function, which enables the problem to be efficiently solved.
4.2. Reformulation via Boole’s Inequality
Firstly, based on the definition of ρlt, we have Pr{Alt}=Pr{xlt= rlt}= ρlt. Then, constraint
(3) is equivalent to
Pr
{
T∧
t=1
L∧
l=1
Alt
}
≥ 1− ǫ. (4)
Also, we define the indicator function I lt(x
l
t) as follows
I lt(x
l
t) :=

0 if x
l
t = r
l
t,
1 otherwise.
(5)
Eq. (5) means that I lt(x
l
t) equals to 1, if x
l
t does not meet the sensing robustness requirement
at time t at location l. Accordingly, I lt(x
l
t) represents the unsatisfiability at time t at location
2Note that optimizing plt is equivalent to optimizing b
l
t, since there is a one-to-one mapping relationship between
them in the bidding function.
l. Via Boole’s Inequality (Bonferroni 1936), we can reformulate PA1 as follows:
PA2: Approximation to PA1
min
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t)
subject to E
{
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
I lt(x
l
t)
}
≤ ǫ. (6)
The following lemma ensures that any feasible solution of PA2 is feasible for PA1.
Lemma 1 Any feasible solution of PA2 is also a feasible solution of PA1.
Proof. Since the objectives of PA1 and PA2 are identical, we only need to prove that (6)
is a sufficient condition for (4). In fact, according to the definition of I lt(x
l
t), the probability
that Alt does not happen equals to the expectation of I
l
t(x
l
t), i.e., 1−Pr{Alt}= E{I lt(xlt)}.
Using this equation and Boole’s Inequality, i.e., Pr{A1
∨
. . .
∨
AN} ≤
∑N
i=1Pr{Ai}, the LHS
of (4) can be lower bounded by
Pr
{
T∧
t=1
L∧
l=1
Alt
}
≥ 1−E
{
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
I lt(x
l
t)
}
. (7)
Therefore, if (6) holds, (4) also holds based on the fact of (7). The lemma is thus proved. 
4.3. Performance Gap Analysis
PA2 can be seen as a conservative approximation to PA1, which substitutes the LHS of (4)
by the RHS of (7) in (4). Note that Lemma 1 only gives the feasibility guarantee. However,
the approximation gap between the optimal values of PA2 and PA1 is still unclear. In the
following, in Section 4.3.1, we first analyze the performance gap between the approximation
solution and the optimal solution by analyzing the conservatism in the constraints, and
provide an initial bound on the performance gap. And we then introduce a relaxed problem
of PA1 to enhance the bound on the performance gap in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1. First Bound on the Performance Gap: We begin with the analysis of the dif-
ference in the conservatism in the approximation of PA2 to PA1 in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The difference between the LHS and RHS of the inequality in (7) is no more
than TL(TL−1)
2
ǫ2.
Proof. Let A¯lt be the complementary event of A
l
t. Then the difference between the LHS
and RHS of the inequality in (7), i.e., △, can be rewritten as
△=Pr
{
T∧
t=1
L∧
l=1
Alt
}
−
[
1−E
{
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
I lt(x
l
t)
}]
=
[
1−Pr
{
L∨
t=1
L∨
l=1
A¯lt
}]
−
[
1−
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
Pr{A¯lt}
]
(8)
=
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
Pr{A¯lt}−Pr
{
L∨
t=1
L∨
l=1
A¯lt
}
(9)
From (4), we know that Pr
{∨T
t=1
∨L
l=1 A¯
l
t
}
≤ ǫ, and thus Pr{A¯lt} ≤ ǫ holds for any t=
1, ..., T and l=1, ..., L. According to Bonferroni Inequalities (Bonferroni 1936), we have 0≤
△≤∑t<t′∑l<l′ Pr{A¯lt∧ A¯l′t′} . In our problem, since the satisfaction of the sensing robust-
ness requirement is relatively independent at any time slot and location, {A¯lt}t=1,...,T,l=1,...,L
is probabilistically independent with each other, then
∑
t<t′
∑
l<l′
Pr
{
A¯lt
∧
A¯l
′
t′
}
≤
∑
t<t′
∑
l<l′
Pr
{
A¯lt
}
Pr{A¯l′t′} ≤
∑
t<t′
∑
l<l′
ǫ · ǫ= TL(TL− 1)
2
ǫ2.
The lemma thus holds. 
Next, we will analyze the performance gap between the optimal solution of PA2 and
that of PA1 based on the above conservatism result. To simplify the notations, we let
F (ρ) :=
∑T
t=1
∑L
l=1 ρ
l
tr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t), G(ρ) := 1 −
∏T
t=1
∏L
l=1 ρ
l
t, and H(ρ) :=
∑T
t=1
∑L
l=1(1 − ρlt),
where ρ := {ρlt}t∈T ,l∈L, ρlt ∈ [0,1],∀t ∈ T , l ∈ L. Thus, PA1 and PA2 can be equivalently
represented as min
G(ρ)≤ǫ
F (ρ), and min
H(ρ)≤ǫ
F (ρ), respectively. To obtain the performance
gap, we first have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let λ˜ and ρ˜ be the optimal solutions of
max
λ≥0
min
ρ
{F (ρ)+λ[H(ρ)− ǫ]} . (10)
Thus, ρ˜ is an optimal solution of PA2.
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing that PA2 is a convex problem with strong
duality. For the convexity, the inequality function H(ρ) is obviously convex, according to
the linear combination of ρlt in H(ρ). As to the objective function, we only need to prove
the convexity of ρltb
l
t(ρ
l
t). Since both b
l
t(ρ
l
t) and ρ
l
t are strictly increasing and convex in
ρlt ∈ [0,1], their product function ρltblt(ρlt) is convex (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004).
Moreover, H(ρ) represents the expected total infeasibility levels over all time slots and
locations under a bidding sequence {blt(ρlt)}t∈T ,l∈L. Thus, if we release large enough bids
at each time slot and location without considering the payment, the number of potential
participants that accept to participate will be always enough. In this case, H(ρ) equals to
0. This means that there exists a variable ρ (corresponding to the bids {blt}t∈T ,l∈L) that
satisfies H(ρ) = 0 < ǫ. In other words, the Slater’s condition holds for PA2. Combining
with the convex property, strong duality holds for PA2. Therefore, ρ˜ is a primal optimal
solution of PA2 (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004). The lemma thus holds. 
Based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can obtain the initial bound about the optimal
value gap between PA1 and PA2 in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let ρ∗ be an optimal solution of PA1. And let λ˜ and ρ˜ be the optimal solutions
of (10), then the gap between the optimal value of PA1 and that of PA2 can be bounded by
0≤ F (ρ˜)−F (ρ∗)≤ λ˜TL(TL− 1)
2
ǫ2. (11)
Proof. We derive the bound in two steps. According to Lemma 3, ρ˜ is an optimal
solution of PA2. We begin with the definitions of λ˜ and ρ˜, which are the solutions of (10).
We then have
F (ρ˜) =max
λ≥0
min
ρ
{F (ρ)+λ[H(ρ)− ǫ]}
=min
ρ
{
F (ρ)+ λ˜[H(ρ)− ǫ]
}
≤ F (ρ∗)+ λ˜[H(ρ∗)− ǫ]
= F (ρ∗)+ λ˜[G(ρ∗)− ǫ+H(ρ∗)−G(ρ∗)]
= F (ρ∗)+ λ˜(G(ρ∗)− ǫ)+ λ˜[H(ρ∗)−G(ρ∗)]
≤ F (ρ∗)+ λ˜[H(ρ∗)−G(ρ∗)]
≤ F (ρ∗)+ λ˜TL(TL− 1)
2
ǫ2. (12)
The second equality follows the definition of λ˜ and the strong duality property. The first
inequality is due to the definition of ρ˜. The second inequality is because of λ˜ ≥ 0 and
G(ρ∗) ≤ ǫ. And the last inequality follows Lemma 2. Further, since the objective is a
minimization and Lemma 1 holds, we have
F (ρ∗)≤ F (ρ˜). (13)
Combining (12) and (13), the theorem thus holds. 
4.3.2. Second Bound by Introducing a Relaxation: Theorem 1 shows that the
performance gap between the optimal solution of PA1 and that of PA2 is actually of the
order of O(T 2L2ǫ2). In the following, we construct a relaxed problem of PA1 to provide
a possible tighter bound. Recall that in Lemma 2, we have obtained Pr{A¯lt} ≤ ǫ for
∀t ∈ T , l ∈ L, which obviously implies ∑Tt=1∑Ll=1Pr{A¯lt} ≤ TLǫ. Therefore, substituting ǫ
by TLǫ in (6), we actually get a relaxed problem of PA1 in the following:
PA3: Relaxation to PA1
min
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t)
subject to E
{
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
I lt(x
l
t)
}
≤ TLǫ. (14)
Similar to PA1 and PA2, PA3 can be simplified as min
H(ρ)≤TLǫ
F (ρ).
Since PA3 is a relaxed problem of PA1, for any feasible solution ρ of PA1, ρ is also
a feasible solution of PA3. Furthermore, utilizing PA3, the performance gap between the
optimal solution of PA1 and that of PA2 can also be bounded by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let ρ∗ be an optimal solution of PA1. And let λ˜ and ρ˜ be the optimal solutions
of (10). Thus, the gap between the optimal value of PA1 and that of PA2 can be also
bounded by
0≤ F (ρ˜)−F (ρ∗)≤ λ˜(TL− 1)ǫ. (15)
Proof. Due to Lemma 3, λ˜ is obviously an optimal solution of PA2. Recall that PA3
is a relaxation to PA1, and the objective is identical as minρF (ρ). Let ρˆ be an optimal
solution of PA3. Combining the result of (13), we have
F (ρˆ)≤ F (ρ∗)≤ F (ρ˜), (16)
which implies
0≤ F (ρ˜)−F (ρ∗)≤ F (ρ˜)−F (ρˆ). (17)
Note that the constraint in PA3 is equivalent to 1
TL
H(ρ) ≤ ǫ. Similar to the proof in
(12), we have
F (ρ˜)≤ F (ρˆ)+ λ˜[H(ρˆ)− 1
TL
H(ρˆ)]
= F (ρˆ)+ λ˜
TL− 1
TL
H(ρˆ)
≤ F (ρˆ)+ λ˜(TL− 1)ǫ, (18)
where the last inequality is because of H(ρˆ)≤ TLǫ.
Due to (17) and (18), we have 0 ≤ F (ρ˜) − F (ρ∗) ≤ λ˜(TL − 1)ǫ. The proof is thus
concluded. 
Combining the results of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we formally record the bound about
the performance gap between the optimal solution of PA1 and that of PA2 below.
Theorem 3 Let ρ∗ be an optimal solution of PA1. And let λ˜ and ρ˜ be the optimal solutions
of (10). Then, the gap between the optimal value of PA1 and that of PA2 can be bounded
by 0≤ F (ρ˜)−F (ρ∗)≤ λ˜min
{
(TL− 1)ǫ, TL(TL−1)
2
ǫ2
}
.
In Theorem 3, if TL> 2
ǫ
, 0≤ F (ρ˜)−F (ρ∗)≤ λ˜(TL− 1)ǫ; otherwise, 0≤ F (ρ˜)−F (ρ∗)≤
λ˜TL(TL−1)
2
ǫ2. Theorem 3 shows the bound about the performance gap between the optimal
solution of the reformulated problem (PA2) and that of the original problem (PA1). Since
both F (ρ) and H(ρ) are differentiable, we can easily obtain the value of λ˜ by the KKT
optimality condition (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004), i.e., ∇F (ρ˜)+ λ˜∇H(ρ˜) = 0. If H(ρ˜)<
0, we then have λ˜= 0; otherwise, we can bound λ˜ by λ˜≤ ‖∇F (ρ˜)‖
‖∇H(ρ˜)‖
.
5. Crowdsensing with Soft Chance Constraint
Different from Section 4, we model the constraint of the sensing robustness requirement
as multiple soft chance constraints in this section. Specifically, the soft chance constraints
ensure that for any location l ∈L, the robustness requirement is satisfied at least αl (αl ∈
(0,1]) percentage over T time slots with a probability of β or more, where β is close to 1,
e.g., 98%. Compared to the hard chance constraint (3) in PA1 in Section 4, this constraint
can not only be more suitable for some kind of tasks with a slightly loose requirement, but
also better characterize the location-specific requirement in the task execution.
5.1. Problem Statement
To formulate the crowdsensing problem with soft chance constraints, we first define an
indicator function I¯ lt(x
l
t), which is the opposite of I
l
t(x
l
t) in Eq. (5), i.e.,
I¯ lt(x
l
t) :=

1 if x
l
t = r
l
t,
0 otherwise.
(19)
Accordingly, we know that E{I¯ lt} = ρlt. In light of Eq. (19), the average times that the
sensing robustness requirement is satisfied at location l ∈ L over task duration T is∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t)/T .
The crowdsensing problem with multiple soft chance constraints can be mathematically
formulated as follows:
PB1: Crowdsensing with Multiple Soft Chance Constraints
min
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t)
subject to Pr
{∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t)
T
≥ αl
}
≥ β,∀l ∈L, (20)
ρlt ∈ [0,1],∀t∈ T , l ∈L.
Similar to PA1 in Section 4, PB1 is also untractable due to the chance constraint in (20).
Unfortunately, we cannot directly apply a similar approximation approach in Section 4 to
PB1, because of the more challenging form of (20).
To obtain a feasible solution of PB1, we study a general payment minimization problem
related to PB1, by transforming (20) into a constraint in expectation for the total times of
success requirement satisfaction for any location as follows:
PB2: A General Payment Minimization Problem with {γl}l∈L
min
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t)
subject to
T∑
t=1
ρlt≥ γl,∀l ∈L, (21)
ρlt ∈ [0,1],∀t∈ T , l ∈L,
which utilizes the fact
E
{
T∑
t=1
I¯ lt(x
l
t)
}
=
T∑
t=1
E
{
I¯ lt(x
l
t)
}
=
T∑
t=1
ρlt,∀l ∈L.
In PB1, (20) guarantees that the probability on the success percentage for each location
l ∈L is lower bounded by β, i.e.,
Pr
{∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t)
T
≥ αl
}
≥ β,
which can imply
E
{∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t)
T
}
≥ αlβ =⇒
T∑
t=1
ρlt≥ Tαlβ. (22)
As a result, if we set γl = Tαlβ in PB2, we can obtain a relaxed problem of PB1 as follows:
PB3: Relaxation to PB1
min
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t)
subject to
T∑
t=1
ρlt≥ Tαlβ,∀l ∈L, (23)
ρlt ∈ [0,1],∀t∈ T , l ∈L.
Although PB3 can be solved by classical convex approaches, its feasible solution may not
be feasible for PB1, since PB3 is only a relaxed version of PB1. Fortunately, in this work,
we find that PB1 and PB2 have a very appealing relationship between their solutions.
We begin with some important notations. Let hl(ρl) be the LHS of (20) in PB1 for each
l ∈L, i.e.,
hl(ρl) = Pr
{∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t)
T
≥ αl
}
, (24)
where ρl := {ρlt}t∈T . And denote the optimal solution of PB2 corresponding to γ be ρ∗(γ) =
{ρ∗l(γl)}l∈L, where γ := {γl}l∈L. Next, we study how the value of hl(ρ∗l(γl)) will change with
the variation of γl. Our findings will reveal that, if we increase the value of γl, h
l(ρ∗l(γl))
also increases. In other words, hl(ρ∗l(γl)) has a positive correlation with the value of γl in
fact. This motivates us to design an algorithm that can find a value of γ˜, so as to obtain
a solution ρ∗(γ˜) feasible for PB1 and with low payment.
In the rest of this section, we will analyze the properties of optimal solutions of PB2 in
Section 5.2, and theoretically prove the above observations in the end of this subsection.
Based on the results of Section 5.2, we then propose a binary search algorithm based
on Monte Carlo method that finds a solution feasible for PB1 with a high probability in
Section 5.3. Using a very similar analysis method as in Section 4, we also theoretically
derive the performance gap between our solution and the optimal solution. Last, in Section
5.4, we study a special case of PB1 by assuming that both the requirement rlt and bidding
function blt(·) are time independent, and derive a closed form solution by approximation.
5.2. Properties of Optimal Solutions of PB2
In this part, we explore several interesting and useful properties of the optimal solutions of
PB2. We begin with some necessary notations. For simplicity, we first let ftl(·) be the inside
of the summation in the objective function in PB2, i.e., ftl(ρ
l
t) = ρ
l
tr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t),∀t ∈ T , l ∈ L.
Let ρl := {ρlt}t=1,...,T and F l(ρl) :=
∑T
t=1 f
l
t(ρ
l
t). Thus, the objective function can also be
represented as F (ρ) =
∑L
l=1F
l(ρl), where ρ= {ρl}l=1,...,L. Recall that in Lemma 3, we have
verified that ftl(ρ
l
t) is strictly increasing and convex in ρ
l
t ∈ [0,1], for any t∈ T , l ∈L, which
implies
f ′tl(ρ
l
t)> 0, f
′′
tl(ρ
l
t)≥ 0,∀ρlt ∈ [0,1]. (25)
Furthermore, since blt(·) is strictly increasing and convex, and f ′′tl(ρlt) = rlt[2blt′(ρlt) +
ρltb
l
t
′′
(ρlt)], we have
f ′′tl(ρ
l
t)> 0,∀ρlt ∈ [0,1], (26)
based on blt
′
(ρlt)> 0 and b
l
t
′′
(ρlt)≥ 0 for ∀ρlt ∈ [0,1].
Since the objective function has a separable structure in location l ∈ L, and the con-
straints for each location l are actually independent with each other, solving PB2 is equiv-
alent to solving L independent subproblems as follows:
PB2.l: The lth Subproblem of PB2
min
T∑
t=1
ftl(ρ
l
t)
subject to
T∑
t=1
ρlt≥ γl, ρlt ∈ [0,1],∀t∈ T . (27)
Suppose that ρ∗l = {ρ∗t l}t=1,...,T is an optimal solution of PB2.l (l = 1, ..., L), then ρ∗ =
{ρ∗l}l=1,...,L will be an optimal solution of PB2; and vice versa. Therefore, in the following,
we focus on the lth subproblem only, whose properties in the optimality also hold for any
other subproblems.
Since ρlt ∈ [0,1] for ∀t ∈ T , l ∈ L, if γl > T , PB2.l will be unsolvable. If γl = T , the
corresponding optimal solution will be meaningless in practical, i.e., ρ∗t
l = 1, t = 1, ..., T ,
which corresponds to the policy that always releases the largest bid, although it is surely
feasible for PB2. Also, if γl ≤ 0, ρ∗t l = 0, t= 1, ..., T , which is obviously infeasible for PB2.
As a result, the rest of this section is based on the assumption of 0< γl <T for l= 1, ..., L
unless specified.
For the first derivative of any optimal solution ρ∗l = {ρ∗t l}t=1,...,T for PB2.l, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let ρ∗l := {ρ∗t l}t=1,...,T be an optimal solution of PB2.l, and f ′tl(ρ∗t l) be the first
derivative of function ftl(·) at ρ∗t l, t= 1, ..., T . Then, we can conclude that
f ′1l(ρ
∗
1
l) = f ′2l(ρ
∗
2
l) = · · ·= f ′T l(ρ∗lT ).
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
Lemma 4 reveals a very interesting property in the property of optimal solutions of
PB2.l, i.e., the first derivatives of each ftl(·) (t= 1, ..., T ) at any optimal solution are equal.
This nice property can be used to show how the value of the optimal solution will change
with the parameter γl, as illustrated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Let ρ∗l(γl) := {ρ∗t l(γl)}t=1,...,T and ρ∗l(γˆl) := {ρ∗t l(γˆl)}t=1,...,T be the optimal solu-
tions corresponding to γl and γˆl in (27) for PB2.l, respectively. If γˆl > γl, then for ∀t =
1, ..., T , we have ρ∗t
l(γˆl)> ρ
∗
t
l(γl).
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
Lemma 5 reveals another important property of the optimal solution of PB2.l: if
we increase the value of γl, the value of the corresponding optimal solution (ρ
∗l(γl) :=
{ρ∗t l(γl)}t=1,...,T ) also strictly increases, i.e., ρ∗t l(γl) is strictly increasing in γl ∈ (0, T ) for
any t= 1, ..., T . Based on this property, we are able to demonstrate how hl(ρ∗l(γl)), which
is the LHS of (20), will change with the increase of γl in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Let ρ∗l(γl) := {ρ∗t l(γl)}t=1,...,T be an optimal solution of PB2.l with γl. Then,
hl(ρ∗l(γl)) as defined in (24) is strictly increasing with the increase of γl.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C. 
According to Theorem 4, if we increase the value of γl, the probability of h
l(ρ∗l(γl))≥ β
is also increasing, since hl(ρ∗l(γl)) increases. This means that the probability that ρ
∗l(γl) :=
{ρ∗lt (γl)}t=1,...,T satisfies the constraint (27) in PB2.l will be higher with the increase of
γl. Thanks to this observation, we are able to find the smallest γl that returns a feasible
solution of PB1, which is introduced in detail in the following subsection.
5.3. A Binary Search Algorithm for PB1
In this subsection, we propose a binary search algorithm for PB1 based on Monte Carlo
method, to obtain a feasible bidding policy for the crowdsensing problem with soft chance
constraints. The key insight of our algorithm is as follows. When we increase the value
of γl from 0 for each subproblem of PB2, the feasibility of its optimal solution to PB1
improves. Since the objective of PB2 is identical to that of PB1, this optimal solution can
be a good approximation solution of PB1 if some feasibility condition holds. Note that in
our algorithm, we utilize binary search to find an appropriate γl between the initial interval
[0, T ]. And the feasibility condition is checked by Monte Carlo method. In the following,
we introduce the proposed algorithm in detail.
For convenience, we first define gl(ρl) := hl(ρl)− β, l = 1, ..., L, where hl(ρl) is defined
in Eq. (24). By definition, a sequence ρ := {ρl}l=1,...,L is feasible for PB1 if gl(ρl) is not
negative, for any l = 1, ..., L. Let ρ∗l(γl) be the optimal solution of PB2.l with γl. For
simplicity, we denote gl(ρ∗l(γl)) by q
l(γl) in the algorithm, for l= 1, ..., L.
As shown in Algorithm 1, we first initialize the search interval [γl, γl] as [0, T], for
each l= 1, ..., L. Then, from Line 1, we independently search the appropriate γl for PB2.l
from l = 1 to L. Line 2 provides the terminal condition for each l, i.e., whenever σ ≤
ql(γl) ≤ σ holds, it records the optimal solution corresponding to σ, and then calculates
the corresponding bidding prices based on the bidding function, as illustrated in Line 11.
Note that the terminal condition means that, we have found an appropriate value γl, whose
corresponding optimal solution of PB2.l (ρ∗l(γl)) is feasible for the lth subproblem of PB1
with a high probability, and the expected payment is not large. The former property is
ensured by imposing a lower bound on ql(γl), i.e., q
l(γl)≥ σ, which is used to reduce the
inevitable error introduced by Monte Carlo method. The latter property is guaranteed by
upper bounding ql(γl) to a value slightly larger than σ, i.e., q
l(γl)≤ σ.
Algorithm 1 Binary Search Algorithm for Crowdsensing with Soft Chance Constraints
Input: Error tolerance σ > σ > 0
Output: Bidding policy bγ for PB1
Initialization: For l= 1, ..., L, set γl = 0 and γl = T .
1: for l= 1, ..., L
2: while ql(γl)>σ ‖ ql(γl)<σ do
3: Obtain the optimal solution of PB2.l with γl =
γl+γl
2
, i.e., ρ∗l = {ρ∗lt }t=1,...,T
4: Compute hl(ρ∗l) by Monte Carlo method
5: if ql(
γl+γl
2
)< 0 then
6: γl← γl+γl2
7: else
8: γl← γl+γl2
9: end if
10: end while
11: Record the optimal solution of PB2.l with γl, e.g., ρ
∗l(γl) = {ρ∗lt (γl)}t=1,...,T , and
then calculate the corresponding bidding prices, i.e.,
b∗l(γl) = {blt(ρ∗lt (γl))}t=1,...,T
12: end for
13: return bγ = {b∗l(γl)}l=1,...,L
Lines 3 - 9 show the main loop of Algorithm 1. In Line 3, the optimal solution of PB2.l
with γl, which is the middle value of the current interval, is obtained, i.e., ρ
∗l = {ρ∗lt }t=1,...,T .
Then, in Line 4, the value of hl(ρ∗l) is computed by Monte Carlo method. Specifically, con-
sider an experiment of T independent events, whose success probabilities are {ρ∗lt }t=1,...,T ,
respectively. Repeat the experiment N times, and record the number of success events
in the nth experiment as kn. Then, h
l(ρ∗l) can be approximated as
∑N
n=1 1(kn≥kl)
N
, where
1(·) is the indicator function. In Line 5, we check whether ql(γl+γl
2
) is negative or not. If
yes, we update the lower value of the search interval as the middle value in Line 6, i.e.,
γl =
γl+γl
2
. Otherwise, the upper value of the interval is updated in Line 8, i.e., γl =
γl+γl
2
.
When the search for all L subproblems has been completed, we return the bidding policy
that contains the bidding prices in all subproblems as the output.
Last, we analyze the performance of the bidding policy computed by Algorithm 1, and
provide an upper bound on the gap between the total payment by the proposed bidding
policy and the optimal payment. Similar as in the hard chance constraint case, our key idea
is to introduce a conservative approximation problem of PB1 and then derive the optimal
value gap between this approximation problem and PB3 (a relaxed problem of PB1), which
can bound the performance gap between the optimal solution and the solution computed
by Algorithm 1. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5 Let F (ρ∗(γ)) and F ∗ denote the payment with ρ∗(γ) obtained by Algorithm 1
and the optimal payment of PB1, respectively. Then, the difference between F (ρ∗(γ)) and
F ∗ can be bounded by
0≤ F (ρ∗(γ))−F ∗≤
L∑
l=1
λ∗l (T −Tαlβ− 1+β),
where λ∗l is the optimal solution of the lth dual problem
max
λl≥0
min
0≤ρlt≤1
{
T∑
t=1
ρltr
lbl(ρlt)+λl(T − 1+β−
T∑
t=1
ρlt)
}
for l= 1, ..., L.
Proof. The proof mainly contains two steps. First, by setting the required percentage
αl as 1 in PB1 and using a similar approximation of PA2 to PA1 in Section 4, we obtain
a very conservative approximation problem of PB1 as follows:
PB4: Approximation to PB1
min
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρltr
l
tb
l
t(ρ
l
t)
subject to
T∑
t=1
ρlt≥ T − 1+β,∀l ∈L, (28)
ρlt ∈ [0,1],∀t∈ T , l ∈L.
Let F ∗a and F
∗
r are the optimal values of PB4 and PB3, respectively. Notice that both
PB3 and PB4 can be solved by independently solving L subproblems (e.g., PB3.l and
PB4.l, l = 1, ..., L), where both PB3.l and PB4.l have a similar expression with PB2.l.
And the difference between the constraint in PB3.l and that in PB4.l is no more than
T − Tαlβ − 1+ β. Then, applying the same process in Theorem 1, the optimal value gap
between PB3.l and PB4.l can be bounded by λ∗l (T −Tαlβ−1+β), where λ∗l is the optimal
solution of the following dual problem
max
λl≥0
min
0≤ρlt≤1
{
T∑
t=1
ρltr
lbl(ρlt)+λl(T − 1+β−
T∑
t=1
ρlt)
}
.
Summing the gaps between each subproblems, we easily have that the optimal value gap
between PB3 and PB4 is upper bounded by F ∗a −F ∗r ≤
∑L
l=1 λ
∗
l (T −Tαlβ− 1+β).
Second, let F (ρ∗(γ)) and F ∗ denote the payment with ρ∗(γ) (obtained by Algorithm 1)
and the optimal payment of PB1, respectively. According to the relationship among the
three problems (i.e., PB1, PB3 and PB4), we then have
F ∗r ≤ F ∗ ≤F (ρ∗(γ))≤ F ∗a ,
which implies 0 ≤ F (ρ∗(γ)) − F ∗ ≤ F ∗a − F ∗r . Based on this inequality, the proof is thus
concluded. 
5.4. A Special Case of PB1
In this part, we consider a special case of PB1, in which both the sensing robustness
requirement rlt and the bidding function b
l
t(·) for any fixed location l ∈ L are time inde-
pendent, i.e., for each location l ∈ L, rlt = rl,∀t ∈ T and blt(·) = bl(·). In other words, for
any location l ∈ L, a same bidding price b at different times can generate a exactly same
accept-to-anticipate probability among the potential participants. Generally, the optimal
bidding policy of this problem is state dependent, whose computational complexity will
be huge when the task duration T is very large. In this case, however, we are able to
obtain a bidding policy that is state independent and simple to compute, based on the
time independent property of the requirement and bidding function. Specifically, a state
independent solution ρ= {ρlt}t∈T ,l∈L for PB1 will have the following property:
ρlt= ρ
l,∀t∈ T , (29)
for each l ∈L, which can make constraint (20) tight in PB1. That is,
Pr
{
K lT+1
T
≥αl
}
≥ β,∀l ∈L, (30)
where K lT+1 is the sum of success times in satisfying the sensing data quality requirement
during the whole duration T , should hold.
Since the bidding policy corresponding to ρ is static (time independent), the random
variable K lT+1 is binomial distributed, i.e., K
l
T+1 ∼ Bin(T, ρ˜l), l ∈ L, where ρ˜l is the trial
probability that the sensing data quality requirement is successfully satisfied. Let ΩB(T,ρ˜l)
represent the CDF of the binomial distribution. In the following, we will derive the value
of ρ˜l that satisfies (29) by approximation, for each l ∈L. According to (29), we have
Ω¯B(T,ρ˜l)(Tαl) = β,∀l ∈L, (31)
where Ω¯B(T,ρ˜l)(Tαl) = 1−ΩB(T,ρ˜l)(Tαl). To obtain a closed form of ρ˜l, we use the Normal
distribution to approximate B(T, ρ˜l) here, since the task duration T can be very large in
the soft chance constraint case. Thus, we have
Ω¯N
(
T ρ˜l−Tαl√
T ρ˜l(1− ρ˜l)
)
= β,∀l ∈L,
where ΩN(·) is the CDF of the Standard Normal distribution. By some operations, we can
approximate ρ˜l as
ρ˜l ≈ αl+xβ
√
αl
T
,∀l ∈L,
where xβ =Ω
−1
N (β).
With this approximation solution, the expected percentage in the success satisfaction of
the sensing requirement will be αl+xβ
√
αl
T
, which is strictly larger than αl, for any l ∈L.
Then, we can construct a solution ρ= {ρl}l=1,...,L= {ρlt}t=1,...,T,l=1,...,L as follows:
ρlt= αl+xβ
√
αl
T
,∀t= 1, ..., T, (32)
for each l= 1, ..., L.
By construction, it is not difficult to verify that ρ is feasible for PB1. Next, we analyze
the gap between the optimal payment of PB1 and the total payment with ρ. We first
introduce a deterministic counterpart of PB2 as follows:
PB5: Deterministic Counterpart of PB2
min T
L∑
l=1
ρˆlrlbl(ρˆ
l) (33)
subject to T ρˆl ≥ γl,∀l ∈L, (34)
ρˆl ∈ [0,1],∀l∈L.
For convenience, we let Fˆ (ρˆ) denote the objective function of PB5, where ρˆ := {ρˆl}l∈L. In
the relationship between the optimal solutions of PB2 and PB5, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 6 Let ρˆ∗= {ρˆl∗}l∈L be an optimal solution of PB5. Then, ρ∗ = {ρlt∗}t∈T ,l∈L will be
an optimal solution of PB2, where ρlt
∗
= ρˆl∗,∀t ∈ T , for each l ∈L.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix D. 
Setting γl = Tαl + xβ
√
Tαl, the solution ρˆ = {ρl}l=1,...,L will be an optimal solution of
PB5, where ρl = αl + xβ
√
αl
T
, l= 1, ..., L. According to Lemma 6, ρ as defined in Eq. (32)
is an optimal solution of PB2. Since PB3 is a relaxation problem of PB1, we can now
employ the similar method to analyze the optimal value gap between PB3 and PB5 with
γl = Tαl + xβ
√
Tαl, which is a upper bound for the gap between the optimal payment of
PB1 and the total payment with the solution ρ.
Theorem 6 Define ρ as in Eq. (32). Let F ∗ be the optimal payment of PB1. Then, the
gap between F ∗ and the total payment with ρ is bounded by
0≤ F (ρ)−F ∗≤
L∑
l=1
λˆl(γl−Tαlβ),
where λˆl is the optimal solution of the lth dual problem
max
λl≥0
min
0≤ρlt≤1
{
T∑
t=1
ρltr
lbl(ρlt)+λl(γl−
T∑
t=1
ρlt)
}
for l= 1, ..., L.
Proof. (Sketch) The gap between the F ∗ and the total payment with ρ is no more
than the optimal value gap between PB3 and PB5 with γl = Tαl + xβ
√
Tαl (l = 1, ..., L).
Notice that both PB3 and PB5 can be solved by solving L subproblems independently.
Applying the same process in Theorem 1, we can obtain the optimal value gap between each
subproblem. Summing the gaps during each subproblem, we then have the final gap. 
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we perform simulations in a crowdsensing scenario with Matlab to validate
our theoretic analysis. Specifically, we compare our bidding policy with the three following
policies: 1) the bidding policy derived from the optimal solution of PA3 for the hard chance
constraint case and PB3 for the soft chance constraint case, respectively, which can be seen
as an lower bound for the optimal payment of our problem in both cases (called as “Lower
Bound” in the following); 2) an uniform policy that chooses the bidding price from the
bidding set with probability 1− ǫ in the hard case and with probability β in the soft case
(labeled as “Uniform Policy” in the figures); 3) a random bidding policy that randomly
selects the bidding price from the bidding set during each time slot for each location
(labeled as “Random Policy”). For the performance metrics, we mainly use the time-
average difference of total payment between a policy (Our Policy/Uniform Policy/Random
Policy) and the policy corresponding to Lower Bound, and the probability that the sensing
robustness requirement is satisfied in the simulations.3
6.1. Setup
We consider a common crowdsensing scenario that needs sensing a target area over one
week with 10 hours in each day. For instance, an environment NGO intends to collect the
air quality information for citizens in a city, i.e., updating the indexes including PM2.5
every hour during daytime. Defining one hour as a time slot, the number of time slots is
T = 70. And the target area can be divided into L= 6 different locations that coverage six
critical sensing regions. The number of required participants at time t at location l, i.e.,
rlt, is randomly chosen from the interval [1, l
2]. The bidding function at time t at location
l is set as blt(x) = lx
3, which is identical for any time t at a fixed location l. As to the
parameter setting, we vary the parameter ǫ from 0 to 0.08 with a step size 0.02 in the hard
chance constraint case, while varying β from 0.91 to 0.99 with a step size 0.02 in the soft
chance constraint case. Moreover, in the latter case, for the required success percentage
at location l (i.e., αl), we consider two settings, i.e., αl is randomly chosen from [0.9,1] or
from [0.75,1]. In the simulation setting of Algorithm 1, we let σ and σ be 0.02 and 0.01,
respectively. In the Monte Carlo simulations, we set the number of repeated simulations
in an experiment as 500.
6.2. Results
6.2.1. Hard Chance Constraint Case: We first show the simulation results for the hard
chance constraint case. Fig. 2 illustrates the time-average gap of total payment between
3Note that this metric is not employed in the soft chance case, since this probability has been ensured by σ and σ in
Algorithm 1.
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Figure 2 Time-Average Payment Gap vs. System Requirement.
Table 1 Success Prob. vs. System Requirement (Hard Chance Constraint).
1− ǫ Our Policy Lower Bound Uniform Policy Random Policy
0.92 0.9229 0.6855 0.0204 1.03E-14
0.94 0.9416 0.7524 0.0557 5.62E-15
0.96 0.9607 0.8304 0.1488 5.46E-15
0.98 0.9802 0.9234 0.3895 1.06E-15
1 1 1 1 6.24E-15
each bidding policy and the bidding policy corresponding to Lower Bound. From the figure,
the time-average gap of total payment of both our proposed policy and uniform policy
decreases with the increase of the system requirement 1− ǫ. This is because when 1− ǫ
increases, corresponding to the case with more stringent system requirement on the sensing
robustness, both policies as well as the “Lower Bound” policy will provides large bids to
satisfy the sensing robustness requirement. In contrary, there is no awareness of the sensing
robustness requirement in the random policy, which results in a lower payment than the
“Lower Bound” policy. And we find that the time-average gap of total payment between
our proposed policy and the “Lower Bound” policy is not large, especially under stringent
sensing robustness requirement.
Table 1 shows the results of the joint probability that the sensing robustness requirement
at any time and location is satisfied under the four bidding policies, compared with the
system requirement. From the table, we can clearly obtain that our policy can always meet
the system requirement, while all the other policies are infeasible. Furthermore, to reduce
the total payment, the joint probability under our policy is just slightly larger than the
system requirement.
6.2.2. Soft Chance Constraint Case: Next, in Figs. 3 and 4, we study the time-average
gap of total payment of our bidding policy computed by Algorithm 1, compared to the
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Figure 3 Time-Average Payment Gap vs. System Requirement under Setting I.
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Figure 4 Time-Average Payment Gap vs. System Requirement under Setting II.
uniform policy and random policy. First, according to Fig. 3, our policy achieves the lowest
time-average gap in the three policies, and the gap shrinks with the increase of system
requirement β. This shows the effectiveness of Algorithm 1 in searching feasible solutions
with low payment to the original problem. Different from Fig. 2, the gap of the uniform
policy is largest, which corresponds to the largest total payment, since it chooses the bids
with the consideration in β only and without considering αl. The results in Fig. 4 is similar
as in Fig. 3, except that the gap of our policy is slightly lower than that of the random
policy when β is large.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we studied how to minimize the total payment with the sensing robustness
requirement in crowdsensing. We for the first time utilized chance constraints to model
the sensing robustness requirement, and considered both the hard chance constraint case
and soft chance constraint case. We reformulated the crowdsensing problem with a hard
chance constraint into a solvable approximation problem. And we proposed a binary search
algorithm based on Monte Carlo method, to obtain a feasible solution of the problem with
soft chance constraints. We also theoretically analyzed the performance gap of our proposed
policies in both two cases. In the future, we plan to consider more detail requirements in
the sensing robustness rather than merely the minimum required participants.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 4
We prove by contradiction. If the conclusion does not hold, there exists at least t, tˆ∈ T (t 6= tˆ), which makes
f ′tl(ρ
∗
t
l) 6= f ′
tˆl
(ρ∗
tˆ
l). Without loss of generality, we assume that f ′tl(ρ
∗
t
l)> f ′
tˆl
(ρ∗
tˆ
l) and t < tˆ. According to (25)
and (26), we know that, for any t∈ T , f ′tl(·) is positive and strictly increasing in ρlt ∈ [0,1]. Thus, there exists
a small value δ (0< δ <min{ρ∗t l,1− ρ∗tˆ l}), such that
f ′tl(ρ
∗
t
l− δ)>f ′
tˆl
(ρ∗
tˆ
l+ δ) (35)
still holds.
Now, we can construct a new feasible solution of PB2.l, whose total payment is smaller than that with ρ∗l
in fact. Consider the following sequence ρ∗v
l:
ρ∗1
l, ..., ρ∗lt−1, ρ
∗
t
l− δ, ρ∗lt+1, ..., ρ∗ltˆ−1, ρ∗tˆ l+ δ, ρ∗ltˆ+1, ..., ρ∗lT ,
which simply substitutes ρ∗t
l and ρ∗
tˆ
l in the optimal solution ρ∗l by ρ∗t
l− δ and ρ∗
tˆ
l+ δ, respectively.
Since ρ∗l is feasible for PB2.l, then
ρ∗1
l+ · · ·+(ρ∗t l− δ)+ · · ·+(ρ∗tˆ l+ δ)+ · · ·+ ρ∗lT
= ρ∗1
l+ · · ·+ ρ∗t l+ · · ·+ ρ∗tˆ l+ · · ·+ ρ∗lT ≥ γl,
which directly implies that ρ∗v
l is also feasible for PB2.l.
Next, we show that the total payment with ρ∗v
l is smaller than that with ρ∗l. Since the only differences
between ρ∗v
l and ρ∗l are the tth component and tˆth component, we have
F l(ρ∗l)−F l(ρ∗vl)
= [ftl(ρ
∗
t
l)+ ftˆl(ρ
∗
tˆ
l)]− [ftl(ρ∗t l− δ)+ ftˆl(ρ∗tˆ l+ δ)]
= [ftl(ρ
∗
t
l)− ftl(ρ∗t l− δ)] + [ftˆl(ρ∗tˆ l)− ftˆl(ρ∗tˆ l+ δ)]
≥ f ′tl(ρ∗t l− δ)δ+ f ′tˆl(ρ∗tˆ l+ δ)(−δ) (36)
= δ[f ′tl(ρ
∗
t
l− δ)− f ′
tˆl
(ρ∗
tˆ
l+ δ)]> 0, (37)
where (36) follows the convexity of ftl(·) and ftˆl(·), and (37) is due to (35) and δ > 0. Accordingly, the total
payment with the optimal solution ρ∗l, i.e., F l(ρ∗l), is larger than that with the feasible solution ρ∗v
l, i.e.,
F l(ρ∗v
l), which obviously contradicts the optimality of ρ∗l.
Therefore, for any t, tˆ ∈ T (t 6= tˆ), f ′tl(ρ∗t l) = f ′tˆl(ρ∗tˆ l) always holds. If f ′tl(ρ∗t l) 6= f ′tˆl(ρ∗tˆ l), we can repeat the
above process in the similar way to construct a feasible solution with smaller total payment, which violates
the optimality of the current solution. The proof thus ends.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 5
This lemma can be proved by contradiction. First, we can draw a conclusion that there exists at least some
t˜ ∈ {1, ..., T }, such that ρ∗
t˜
l(γˆl) ≥ ρ∗t˜ l(γl) holds. Otherwise, for ∀t = 1, ..., T , ρ∗t l(γˆl) < ρ∗t l(γl) holds. Since
ρ∗l(γˆl) is feasible for P2.l with γˆl, we obtain
T∑
t=1
ρ∗t
l(γˆl)≥ γˆl >γl,
which implies that ρ∗l(γˆl) is also feasible for PB2.l with γl. And because ftl(·) is strictly increasing in [0,1]
for t= 1, ..., T , we have
F l(ρ∗l(γˆl)) =
L∑
t=1
ftl(ρ
∗
t
l(γˆl))<
L∑
t=1
ftl(ρ
∗
t
l(γl)) = F
l(ρ∗l(γl)).
According to the above, ρ∗l(γˆl) is feasible for PB2.l with γl, whose total payment is smaller than the solution
ρ∗l(γl). This result contradicts the optimality of ρ
∗l(γl).
Hence, ρ∗
t˜
l(γˆl)≥ ρ∗t˜ l(γl) holds for some t˜∈ {1, ..., T }. This will result in the fact that ρ∗t l(γˆl)≥ ρ∗t l(γl) holds
for any t ∈ T . Otherwise, there exists some t´ ∈ T , such that ρ∗
t´
l(γˆl) < ρ
∗
t´
l(γl) holds. Since f
′
tl(·) is strictly
increasing in [0,1] for t=1, ..., T , we obtain
f ′
t˜l
(ρ∗
t˜
l(γˆl))> f
′
t˜l
(ρ∗
t˜
l(γl)). (38)
According to Lemma 4, we have
f ′
t˜l
(ρ∗
t˜
l(γˆl)) = f
′
t´l
(ρ∗
t´
l(γˆl)),
f ′
t˜l
(ρ∗
t˜
l(γl)) = f
′
t´l
(ρ∗
t´
l(γl)). (39)
Based on (38) and (39), we have
f ′
t´l
(ρ∗
t´
l(γˆl))> f
′
t´l
(ρ∗
t´
l(γl)), (40)
which implies ρ∗
t´
l(γˆl)> ρ
∗
t´
l(γl), due to the strictly increasing property of f
′
t´l
(·). Thus, the assumption does
not holds. In other words, for any t∈ T , ρ∗t l(γˆl)≥ ρ∗t l(γl).
Next, we prove that the equality cannot be maintained for ρ∗t
l(γˆl)≥ ρ∗t l(γl), for any t ∈ T . Similar to the
proof of ρ∗
t´
l(γˆl)≥ ρ∗t´ l(γl) in the above, if ρ∗t˜ l(γˆl) = ρ∗t˜ l(γl) holds for some t˜ ∈ T , then it holds for any t ∈ T .
This utilizes the conclusion of Lemma 4, and the strictly increasing property of f ′tl(·) for any t∈ T .
Further, it is not difficult to verify that PB2.l is a convex problem with strong duality. According to the
KKT conditions, we have
T∑
t=1
f ′tl(ρ
∗
t
l(γl))−λ∗(γl)T = 0, (41)
λ∗(γl)[
T∑
t=1
ρ∗t
l(γl)− γl] = 0, (42)
where λ∗(γl) is the optimal solution of the dual problem corresponding to PB2.l with γl. Since f
′
tl(ρ
∗
t
l(γl)) is
positive for t= 1, ..., T , λ∗(γl) is also positive according to Eq. (41). Then, from Eq. (42), we know that
T∑
t=1
ρ∗t
l(γl)− γl = 0, (43)
which also holds for the substitution of γˆl for γl. Therefore, if ρ
∗
t
l(γl) = ρ
∗
t
l(γˆl) for t = 1, ..., T , due to Eq.
(43), we obtain γl = γˆl, which violates the initial assumption.
To summarize, if γˆl > γl, then ρ
∗
t
l(γˆl)> ρ
∗
t
l(γl) holds for any t ∈ T . The lemma is thus proved.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 4
We begin with some explanations of hl(ρl). Let kl be the integer that is the nearest interger to Tαl and no
less than Tαl, i.e.,
kl :=
{
Tαl if Tαl is an integer,
[Tαl] + 1 otherwise,
where [·] is the round operation. Since αl ∈ (0,1], we have kl ∈ {1, ..., T }. Then, hl(ρl) is equivalent to
hl(ρl) =Pr
{
T∑
t=1
I¯ lt(x
l
t)≥ kl
}
.
Recall that Alt denotes the event of x
l
t = r
l
t for t = 1, ..., T and l = 1, ..., L, whose success probability is ρ
l
t.
According to the definition of I¯ lt(x
l
t) in Eq. (19),
∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t) is equal to the number of success events from
the T independent events, i.e., Al1, ...,A
l
T . Therefore, h
l(ρl) is equal to the probability that at least kl events
happen in the T events, where the success probability of the tth event is ρlt, i.e., Pr{Alt}= ρlt. In the following,
we focus on hl(ρ∗l(γl)), where ρ
∗l(γl) := {ρ∗t l(γl)}t=1,...,T is an optimal solution of PB2.l with γl.
Based on Lemma 5, if γl increases to γ˜l, the corresponding optimal solution also increases, i.e., for any t=
1, ..., T , ρ∗t
l(γ˜l) is larger than ρ
∗
t
l(γl). This means that the success probability of any event A
l
t (t= 1, ..., T ) is
increased. In the following, by mathematical induction on the number of events (e.g., i) with increased success
probabilities, we prove that hl(ρ∗l(γ˜l)) also becomes larger than h
l(ρ∗l(γl)) when the success probabilities of
all events are increased.
For the base case, i.e., i= 1, we first show that the conclusion holds, when there is only one event whose
success probability increased. Since the T events are independent with each other, without loss of generality,
assume that only ρ∗1
l(γl) is increased to ρ
∗
1
l(γ˜l), while ρ
∗
2
l(γl), ..., ρ
∗
T
l(γl) keep unchanged. Let an experiment
be a run of the T events. Consider the two experiments with the two following success probability sequences,
respectively:
1) ρ∗1
l(γl), ρ
∗
2
l(γl), ..., ρ
∗
T
l(γl);
2) ρ∗1
l(γ˜l), ρ
∗
2
l(γl), ..., ρ
∗
T
l(γl).
We now proceed to compare the outputs of the two above experiments, where the output is defined as the
number of total success events, i.e.,
∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t). We say an experiment succeeds only if
∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t) is no
less than kl.
Let k− be the number of success events from {Alt}t=2,...,T . Based on the value of k−, we divide the output
into three cases as follows. If k− ≥ kl, which corresponds to the case when at least kl events from {Alt}t=2,...,T
happen, then
∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t) ≥ kl holds, no matter whether the event Al1 happens or not. If k− < kl − 1,
corresponding to the case when the number of success events from {Alt}t=2,...,T is less than kl−1,
∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t)
will be less than kl, no matter whether the event A
l
1 happens or not. In the above two cases, the outputs of
the two experiments are identical. If k− = kl− 1, which corresponds to the case when there are exactly kl− 1
success events from {Alt}t=2,...,T , the output will be determined by the result of the event Al1. Since ρ∗1l(γ˜l)
is larger than ρ∗1
l(γl), the probability of
∑T
t=1 I¯
l
t(x
l
t) = kl in the second experiment is higher than that in the
first experiment. To sum, the success probability of the second experiment is higher than that of the first
one, which directly implies hl(ρ∗l(γ˜l))>h
l(ρ∗l(γl)).
Next, we assume that the conclusion holds for i = n (n ≤ T − 1). Without loss of generality, suppose
that ρ∗t
l(γl) is increased to ρ
∗
t
l(γ˜l), t= 1, ..., n, while ρ
∗
t
l(γl) is unchanged for t= n+1, ..., T . Let ρ
∗
v
l be the
corresponding changed success probability sequence, i.e.,
ρ∗v
l := {ρ∗1l(γ˜l), ..., ρ∗nl(γ˜l), ρ∗ln+1(γl), ρ∗ln+2(γl), ..., ρ∗lT (γl)}.
Under our assumption, we obtain
hl(ρ∗v
l)>hl(ρ∗l(γl)). (44)
We then consider the case when we increase one more success probability, e.g., ρ∗ln+1(γl) is increased to
ρ∗ln+1(γ˜l). And let ρ
∗l
v+
denote the changed probability sequence based on ρ∗v
l, i.e.,
ρ∗lv+ := {ρ∗1l(γ˜l), ..., ρ∗nl(γ˜l), ρ∗ln+1(γ˜l), ρ∗ln+2(γl), ..., ρ∗T l(γl)}.
Compared to ρ∗v
l, the only difference is that ρ∗ln+1(γl) is substituted by ρ
∗l
n+1(γ˜l) in ρ
∗l
v+
. Since ρ∗ln+1(γ˜l) is
larger than ρ∗ln+1(γl), we can apply the similar process as in the base case to prove that h
l(ρ∗l
v+
) > hl(ρ∗v
l)
holds. Due to (44), we have hl(ρ∗l
v+
)>hl(ρ∗l(γl)), which implies that the conclusion holds for i= n+1.
Therefore, the conclusion comes into existence for any i= 1, ..., T . The proof is thus concluded.
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 6
The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that For any feasible solution ρ= {ρlt}t∈T ,l∈L to PB2, we can
construct a feasible solution ρˆ= {ρˆl}l∈L to PB4, where
ρˆl =
∑T
t=1 ρ
l
t
T
,∀l ∈L.
And Fˆ (ρˆ) ≤ F (ρ) holds. For the feasibility, we only need to prove that the constructed ρˆ can satisfy (34).
Since ρ is a feasible solution of PB2, i.e.,
T∑
t=1
ρlt ≥ γl, (45)
which utilizes the fact that E{I¯ lt(xlt)}= ρlt. According to (45) and the definition of ρˆ, ρˆ is thus feasible for
PB4.
Next, recall that we have proved that function xbl(x) is convex in x ∈ [0,1] in Lemma 3. Therefore, we
have
ρˆlbl(ρˆ
l)≤
T∑
t=1
1
T
ρltbl(ρ
l
t). (46)
Multiplying by Trl in both sides and summing over l= 1, ..., L in (46), we have
L∑
l=1
Trlρˆlbl(ρˆ
l)≤
L∑
l=1
rl
T∑
t=1
ρltbl(ρ
l
t),
which results in Fˆ (ρˆ)≤ F (ρ). The first step is completed.
Second, let ρˆ∗ = {ρˆl∗}l∈L be the optimal solution of PB4. We prove that we can obtain a feasible solution
ρ∗ = {ρlt∗}t∈T ,l∈L to PB2, where ρlt∗ = ρˆl∗,∀t∈ T , for each l ∈L. Moreover, Fˆ (ρˆ∗) = F (ρ∗) holds. The feasibility
can be verified simply by the definition of ρ∗ and the feasibility of ρˆl∗ to (34). As to the equivalence, by
definition, the objective value of PB2 for solution ρ∗ is
F (ρ∗) =
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρlt
∗
rlbl(ρ
l
t
∗
)
=
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
ρˆl∗r
lbl(ρˆ
l
∗) = T
L∑
l=1
ρˆl∗r
lbl(ρˆ
l
∗) = F (ρˆ
∗).
Based on the above steps, the lemma is thus proved.
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